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The lifesaving processes of organ donation and transplantation in neonatology and 
pediatrics carry important ethical considerations. The medical community must balance 
the principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice to ensure the best 
interest of the potential donor and to provide equitable benefit to society. Accordingly, 
the US Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) has established 
procedures for the ethical allocation of organs depending on several donor-specific 
and recipient-specific factors. To maximize the availability of transplantable organs and 
opportunities for dying patients and families to donate, the US government has man-
dated that hospitals refer potential donors in a timely manner. Expedient investigation 
and diagnosis of brain death where applicable are also crucial, especially in neonates. 
Empowering trained individuals from organ procurement organizations to discuss organ 
donation with families has also increased rates of consent. Other efforts to increase 
organ supply include recovery from donors who die by circulatory criteria (DCDD) in 
addition to donation after brain death (DBD), and from neonates born with immediately 
lethal conditions such as anencephaly. Ethical considerations in DCDD compared to 
DBD include a potential conflict of interest between the dying patient and others who 
may benefit from the organs, and the precision of the declaration of death of the donor. 
Most clinicians and ethicists believe in the appropriateness of the Dead Donor Rule, 
which states that vital organs should only be recovered from people who have died. 
The medical community can maximize the interests of organ donors and recipients by 
observing the Dead Donor Rule and acknowledging the ethical considerations in organ 
donation.
Keywords: organ donation, biomedical ethics, donation after circulatory determination of death, brain death, dead 
donor rule
APPLiCATiONS OF eTHiCAL PRiNCiPLeS TO ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATiON
Organ transplantation involves a potentially lifesaving gift from the donor to the recipient. However, 
numerous ethical considerations exist, especially in pediatrics and neonates. Practitioners involved 
in pediatric and neonatal organ transplantation should apply the four principles of biomedical 
ethics, namely autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice (1). Autonomy is the right of 
self-determination. Since most children lack that capacity, we respect autonomy based on the best 
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interest of the child as determined by a surrogate decision-maker 
who is usually a family member. In organ donation, the best 
interest of the dying child often extends to the family by bringing 
comfort in helping others. Non-maleficence is the principle of 
doing no harm. Ethically, the act of organ recovery should not 
cause the death of a donor, and it should not cause any pain to 
the donor. The logical correlate is that one should only recover 
vital organs from dead donors. Negatively impacting the end-of-
life care of the donor could also cause harm. This can include 
procedures occurring before the declaration of death that benefit 
the recipient but offer no direct benefit to the donor, for example 
the consent process, procedures to preserve organ viability, and 
in some cases the timing and setting of withdrawal of support. 
Beneficence is the principle that people should do good. The 
medical community should give the potential donors and families 
the opportunity to donate because it may provide them comfort 
in knowing there is meaning or worth behind the death. Also, 
providing a potentially lifesaving organ for a recipient with end-
stage organ failure is an act of beneficence. Justice is the fair and 
equitable allocation of resources in light of what is due to persons. 
One must consider whether persons dying on an organ transplant 
waiting list have the right to access organs of dying patients who 
will no longer use them.
These are prima facie principles in that each is binding unless 
it conflicts with another. For example, euthanasia and organ 
recovery has been performed on patients in whom the decision 
to withdraw support has been made (2). While we may maximize 
justice by providing organs to recipients who will benefit from 
them more than the dying patient, most in the medical com-
munity would believe that the maleficence inherent in killing a 
person would override that consideration. To consider the right 
course, practitioners must weigh all four principles of biomedical 
ethics, especially in pediatric and neonatal organ donation and 
transplantation.
PROCeDUReS AND GUiDeLiNeS FOR 
PeDiATRiC ORGAN DONATiON AND 
TRANSPLANTATiON
The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) 
is the system overseen by the US Department of Health and 
Human Services, which manages organ procurement, donation, 
and transplantation for the United States. The United Network 
for Organ Sharing (UNOS) is the private non-profit organization 
operating under OPTN that manages the organ transplantation 
system under contract with the federal government. UNOS man-
ages the national transplant waiting list, maintains the database 
containing information on every transplant occurring in the 
US, and monitors organ allocation. Individual organ transplant 
programs and all local organ procurement organizations (OPOs) 
in the US are OPTN/UNOS members and are required to follow 
their policies. Such policies followed by transplant programs 
and OPOs include criteria established by the OPTN to ethically 
allocate organs based on many factors, including the time on the 
waiting list, suitability of the available organ, and benefit to the 
recipient. Many of these policies confer some benefit to potential 
pediatric recipients. For example, the new lung allocation score 
is based on many recipient-specific factors, such as severity of 
organ failure and specifics of primary illness (3). It also allows 
children higher priority to receive organs before they can be 
offered to adults. Liver allocation to children is not solely based 
on time on the waiting list, but also on the severity of liver dis-
ease represented by the pediatric end-stage liver disease (PELD) 
score or the model for end-stage liver disease (MELD) score. 
Revised policies assign higher priority to pediatric recipients for 
kidneys from donors <35 years old, and to recipients <11 years 
old because of the impact of renal failure on growth (4). Lastly, 
pediatric heart transplant candidates have additional priority 
over adult candidates for adolescent donor hearts (4).
In an effort to increase availability of transplantable organs, 
the United States Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
mandated in 1998 that all hospitals participating in Medicare 
and Medicaid programs conduct timely referrals of all potential 
organ donors to their local OPO (5). These hospitals must also 
inform all families of potential organ donors of their option to 
donate and to allow on-site OPO personnel trained in discussing 
the potential for organ donation. In a 2010 policy statement that 
was reaffirmed in 2014, the American Academy of Pediatrics 
(AAP) supported of the role of the OPOs in establishing a system 
of approaching all potential organ donor families by individuals 
trained in all aspects of organ donation, including psychological, 
social, medical, and procedural (6). Most states are covered by 
more than one OPO, and every area of the country has coverage. 
In response to a referral from a member of the primary medical 
team identifying a potential donor, the OPO evaluates the poten-
tial donor, discusses donation with families, obtains consent, 
arranges recovery of organs, and facilitates distribution of organs 
according to OPTN policies.
Ethically, there should be no conflict of interest between a 
dying child and potential organ recipients. Perception of families 
and the public is also very important. Families should believe that 
the primary medical team and the medical community as a whole 
have no other consideration in mind other than the well-being of 
their child. If they perceive any influence of the prospect of organ 
donation on end-of-life decisions or recommendations, they may 
interpret this as a conflict of interest, even when the medical team 
and OPO have the best of intentions. Therefore, it is important to 
“decouple” the processes of declaration of death with discussion 
of organ transplantation. Indeed, the practices of trained OPO 
members approaching families and the “decoupling” process 
significantly increase the rate of consent for organ donation 
(7–10). Any member of the medical team can make a referral of a 
potential organ donor. Timely referral increases the chances that 
the family will agree to donation. A referral that occurs too late in 
the dying process can cause a delay in OPO personnel assessing 
the suitability of the potential donor, a rushed approach with the 
family, or donor ineligibility. The medical community’s primary 
responsibility is to care for the dying patient. Although there is 
no harm in an early referral, the prospect of organ donation must 
not influence medical and end-of-life decision making because it 
would constitute a conflict of interest. For example, withdrawal 
of life-sustaining therapy may be in the best interest of a child 
with an irreversibly devastating clinical condition that is either 
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likely to be fatal or result in a poor quality of life. However, since 
these decisions are often fraught with many considerations such 
as clinical uncertainty, value judgments, religion, and family 
specific factors, it is important for the medical team to support the 
decision for the patient and family’s interests without considering 
any potential benefit to others.
THe “DeAD DONOR RULe”
Ethically, the removal of vital organs should not cause the death of 
an organ donor, because actively causing death constitutes killing. 
Throughout most of human existence, we have viewed death as the 
cessation of breathing and circulation. The medical community 
viewed death similarly until just a few decades ago. Indeed, the 
first organ transplants occurred after death was declared by cir-
culatory criteria (11). This is known as donation after circulatory 
determination of death (DCDD) or non-heart-beating donation 
(NHBD). However, advancements in critical care made it pos-
sible to sustain circulation indefinitely in a person with no brain 
function. In 1968, an ad hoc committee from Harvard University 
published a report on “irreversible coma” which evolved into 
criteria for the neurologic determination of death, or “brain 
death” (12). In 1981, the US President’s Commission released the 
Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), which states that 
the condition of death can be satisfied based on neurologic crite-
ria or circulatory criteria. Brain death is the irreversible cessation 
of function of the entire brain, including the brainstem, and 
circulatory death is the irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory functions (13). The UDDA is a law. A person declared 
dead by circulatory or neurologic criteria is dead by medical, ethi-
cal, and legal standpoints. The organ transplantation community 
has invoked the UDDA to informally establish the “Dead Donor 
Rule” which states that one can only retrieve vital organs after the 
declaration of death. Since then, the majority of organ transplants 
have occurred after the donor has been declared brain dead. This 
is known as donation after brain death (DBD) or heart-beating 
donation (HBD). One benefit of DBD compared to DCDD is less 
ischemia and improved graft survival, because the heart is beating 
until the moment of organ recovery (14, 15).
The diagnosis of death is ethically and procedurally easy for a 
clinician if resuscitation is not undertaken. In the setting of a “do 
not resuscitate” order or in withdrawal of support, the clinician 
waits for circulation to stop, listens for heart sounds after a wait-
ing period, and declares death. In a failed resuscitation, it can be 
difficult to ascertain futility of achieving return of spontaneous 
circulation. Diagnosing death in the context of a potential organ 
donation is even more challenging because one always considers 
the interests of the recipient to some extent while the donor is still 
alive. It is important for the clinician to acknowledge this fact and 
to minimize the conflict of interest. One method is to standardize 
the criteria for diagnosing death both by neurologic criteria and 
for circulatory criteria prior to organ donation.
DONATiON AFTeR BRAiN DeATH
Although the 1968 Harvard report and the 1981 Uniform 
Determination of Death Act were important in laying the 
groundwork of diagnosing brain death, standardization was nec-
essary to prevent variability in criteria and practice. There were 
several reports of children with a clinical examination consistent 
with brain death but who subsequently regained normal neuro-
logic function (16). However, all of these patients were victims 
of accidental cold water drowning. Also, the existing criteria did 
not apply to children <5 years of age. In 1987, the AAP estab-
lished criteria to standardize determination of brain death in 
children including full-term infants 7 days of age or greater (17). 
The guidelines emphasized determining the proximate cause of 
the coma to establish the irreversibility of the brain dead state. 
This is crucial in ruling out potentially reversible causes such as 
toxic and metabolic conditions, hypothermia, hypotension, and 
surgically remediable conditions. The presence of any of those 
factors precludes a diagnosis of brain death. The clinical examina-
tion consists of documenting the complete absence of function 
of the entire brain and brainstem. This includes complete loss 
of consciousness, no spontaneous movements, no reaction to 
stimuli, no function or reflexes of the cranial nerves, and no 
spontaneous breathing during apnea testing. Any evidence of 
brain or brainstem function precludes a diagnosis of brain death. 
An age-dependent period of observation between the two exami-
nations is required to diagnose brain death. In 2011, the AAP 
provided an important update of the guidelines (18). Clinicians 
can now diagnose brain death in term newborns defined as 
37 weeks gestational age or greater. The guidelines delineate the 
role of the ancillary studies, which include electroencephalogram 
(EEG) and radionuclide cerebral blood flow study. Clinicians may 
obtain an ancillary study if any component of brain death testing 
cannot be performed. Instability of respiration or circulation 
during apnea testing is the most common reason for this. If any 
component of the clinical exam is equivocal, the clinician can 
also obtain an ancillary study. However, they are otherwise not 
necessary for the diagnosis of brain death, and they do not serve 
as a substitute for the clinical exam. In fact, practitioners must 
take careful consideration prior to obtaining an ancillary study, 
because they cannot declare brain death if the study is equivocal 
or not consistent with brain death.
By the time the diagnosis of brain death is considered for a 
patient, the medical team should already have notified the OPO of 
the potential for organ donation. Ideally, OPO personnel should 
be on-site at that point. In fact, the US Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) mandates a referral of any patient with 
an acute brain injury with “imminent death,” which can be inter-
preted as a Glasgow Coma Score of <4 or 5 (19). Physicians are 
ethically obligated to diagnose death as soon as it has occurred, 
because it is in the best interest of the patient and the family. This 
is true under any circumstance in which death occurs, whether 
after withdrawal of support, an unexpected death, a failed resus-
citation, or the death of a potential organ donor. Prior to death, 
physicians may treat a dying patient with aggressive medical 
management or palliative care. By diagnosing death, the medical 
team can shift care of the patient away from these approaches and 
focus either on the respectful care of a human body or the care 
of the organ donor, if applicable. With established brain death 
criteria, testing confers no conflict of interest between the patient 
and any potential organ recipient, because it is in the patient’s 
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best interest to make the diagnosis. OPO personnel should initi-
ate discussions of organ donation if the family has not already 
done so, because it has been shown to increase consent rates (20). 
The exact timing of when to approach the family is controversial. 
Most clinicians agree that families should not be approached 
before they have come to the realization that their child will 
die. Approaching families after the first brain death exam (if it 
is consistent with brain death) may balance the considerations 
of perceived conflict of interest and donation/transplantation 
logistics. At that point, the family will have had time to come 
to terms with the fact that the child may be already gone, and 
they may be receptive of information regarding donation without 
perceiving a conflict of interest.
If the second exam is consistent with brain death, the clini-
cian can declare death at that time. If the child is a possible 
organ donor, supportive care for the organs should continue. 
Otherwise, care of the body should be according to the family’s 
wishes, unless there is a request from the medical examiner. A 
person who has been declared brain dead is medically, legally, 
and ethically dead. It is not up to a family to accept or not accept 
the diagnosis, and there is no consent process for disconnecting 
the machines maintaining breathing and circulation. Brain death 
can be a difficult concept for a family to process. The normative 
societal view of death is of a cold, gray, lifeless body. To see a loved 
one lying in a bed in a warm and peaceful state with vital signs 
on a monitor is more likely to project a view of sleep rather than 
death. Acknowledging this difficulty and preparing the family for 
death is crucial in the process of decoupling medical care from 
organ donation, and can help to improve consent rates.
DONATiON AFTeR CiRCULATORY 
DeTeRMiNATiON OF DeATH
According to the UDDA, the other path to death besides by neu-
rologic criteria is by circulatory criteria. DCDD is the recovery of 
organs for transplantation after death is declared after circulation 
stops followed by a waiting period in which it does not spontane-
ously restart. Currently, the majority of transplantable organs 
originate from brain dead donors. In the infancy of organ trans-
plantation in the era prior to the establishment of brain death 
criteria, transplanted organs generally originated from donors 
declared dead by circulatory criteria (11). In the early 1990s, 
many institutions established protocols for DCDD in an effort to 
increase transplantable organs (21). Accordingly, the number of 
organs originating from pediatric DCDD donors has increased 
(22). Protocols for organ recovery in children by DCDD vary, but 
generally include the following (23):
• Eligibility: patients are eligible for DCDD if the decision to 
withdraw support has been made prior to the decision to donate 
organs, and if there is informed written consent for DCDD.
• Setting: withdrawal of support occurs in the operating room, 
perioperative area, or intensive care unit, and staff provides 
therapies for comfort as indicated by standard end-of-life care.
• Declaration of death: after circulation stops and does not 
resume after a waiting period (usually 2–5 min), a physician 
declares death and organs may be recovered.
• Delayed cessation of circulation: if circulation does not stop 
within a preset period (usually 60–120 min), the patient is no 
longer a DCDD candidate and end-of-life care continues.
Policy statements by the Institute of Medicine, American 
College of Critical Care Medicine, and the AAP have endorsed 
the practice and ethical robustness of DCDD (6, 24, 25). 
However, several studies from the perspectives of neurologists 
and perioperative personnel (26), pediatric critical care physi-
cians (27), multidisciplinary task forces (28), and the general 
public (29) have identified ethical considerations in pediatric 
DCDD. Applications of ethical principles can guide the medical 
community in making individual and policy decisions involving 
DCDD.
One issue is with patient autonomy and informed consent. 
Children are ethically and legally incapable of providing informed 
consent. Although some children may have attained the develop-
mental stage to provide assent, they are likely too ill to do so in 
the context of DCDD. The surrogate decision maker, who usually 
is a family member, provides informed consent based on the best 
interest of the patient. We universally consider some decisions, 
such as an appendectomy for appendicitis, in the best interest 
of the patient because it is a relatively low risk definitive cure 
for a condition that could otherwise be fatal. However, the only 
potential benefit to the DCDD donor is through the altruistic act 
of helping others. Some have questioned whether altruism can be 
presumed on behalf of a child, and therefore whether DCDD can 
be consistent with the best interest standard (28).
Another issue is determining the precise moment when the 
DCDD donor is dead and therefore eligible to undergo organ 
recovery. If a physician declares death inappropriately early, the 
death could be caused by the organ recovery. This compromises 
the ethical principle of non-maleficence and violates the Dead 
Donor Rule. If death is declared too late, a higher degree of 
organ ischemia occurs, compromising the ethical principles of 
beneficence and justice. In DCDD, a waiting period after circula-
tion stops must be observed to ensure against the occurrence 
of spontaneous resumption of circulation. This phenomenon is 
known as autoresuscitation. There are many reports of autore-
suscitation, but the vast majority occurs in adults and in the 
context of a failed resuscitation, which implies the presence of 
administered resuscitation medications in the circulation (30, 
31). Some have questioned the worthiness of the Dead Donor 
Rule, arguing that since the declaration of death in this context 
is somewhat arbitrary, waiting periods can lead to the decay of 
the donor’s altruistic gift (32). Others have suggested revising the 
irreversibility criterion of the Dead Donor Rule. Although the 
medical team could restore circulation in many DCDD donors 
if active resuscitation is undertaken, it would not occur because 
a patient undergoing withdrawal of support does not receive 
resuscitation. Therefore, although circulation has not irreversibly 
stopped, it has permanently stopped. Accordingly, terminol-
ogy of NHBD has shifted from “Donation after Cardiac Death 
(DCD)” to “Donation after Circulatory Determination of Death 
(DCDD).” Also, this distinction has led to the ethical justifica-
tion of successful cardiac transplantation from a DCDD donor 
(33). However, some have expressed concern over changing the 
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standard for diagnosing death in the context of organ recovery 
with the sole purpose of recovering more organs (34).
Providing benefit to the donor is another consideration in 
DCDD ethics. Many physicians believe that DCDD can benefit 
the donor by having a positive impact on the emotional state of 
the grieving family and increasing meaning and worth of the 
donor’s death (27). Also, focus groups at Children’s Hospital of 
Boston cited “making it happen for families” who wanted to help 
other children through the gift of organ donation as the primary 
reason for establishing a DCDD program (28).
Regarding benefit to society, distributive justice is defined as 
fair and equitable treatment in light of what is due to persons (1). 
People who are suffering from a disease that could be ameliorated 
by a transplant may have some right to receive organs that are 
no longer of use to their owners, i.e., dead persons and those 
undergoing withdrawal of life-sustaining therapies. However, 
the risk to the donor compels us to weigh it against other ethical 
principles. For example, someone who cannot consent for the 
procedure may suffer a violation of autonomy. Also, if medical or 
transplantation personnel hasten death or become influenced by 
a conflict of interest, a violation of non-maleficience can occur.
Overall, prominent medical societies and the literature as 
a whole support DCDD as an ethically sound practice and 
as a means to increase the supply of transplantable organs. 
Most practitioners support abiding by the “Dead Donor Rule.” 
Transplantation personnel should obtain fully informed consent 
with the potential donor’s best interest in mind. Physicians should 
optimize the exact timing of the declaration of death. Lastly, the 
medical community should give families who are interested in 
organ donation the opportunity to donate, but consider the deli-
cate balance of approaching families without a real or perceived 
conflict of interest.
UNiQUe NeONATAL CONSiDeRATiONS iN 
ORGAN DONATiON
Neonates represent a particularly challenging group in consider-
ing organ donation and allocation. Over the last several decades, 
improvements in pediatric cardiac surgery and critical care have 
resulted in improved corrective and palliative techniques and 
survival in previously lethal conditions. Similar improvements 
have also led to increased heart transplant recipient survival in 
conditions not amenable to palliation and in instances where 
these techniques have failed (35). While the demand for neonatal 
hearts for transplantation has thus increased, the gap between 
the supply and demand continues to grow. The mortality rate 
for infants <1 year of age who are waiting for a heart transplant 
is fivefold greater than that of the age groups of 1–5, 6–10, and 
11–17 years (36).
Over the past decade, much of the research in identifying 
potential neonatal organ donors has centered around DCDD. In 
a single-center study of 117 NICU deaths over a 5-year period in 
babies weighing more than 2.5 kg, five infants were identified as 
potential DCDD heart donors because they died within 30 min of 
elective withdrawal of support and had good cardiac function and 
no active infection (37). Another single-center study of 359 deaths 
over a 10-year period after withdrawal of life support of neonates 
weighing ≥1.8 kg identified approximately 50 potential en bloc 
kidney donors (38). A more recent study evaluating 136 NICU 
deaths revealed that despite 44% meeting criteria for DCDD, 
fewer than 10% were appropriately referred to the regional OPO 
for evaluation, and only four neonates underwent successful 
DCDD (39). The most frequent reason for donor ineligibility was 
non-referral or late referral by the medical team. A study with 
even stricter criteria of weight threshold and warm ischemic time 
in a 3-year review of 200 neonatal deaths revealed the missed 
potential of recovering 14 livers, 18 kidneys, and 10 hearts (40). 
These are single-center studies each representing relatively small 
numbers. A concerted widespread effort to identify potential 
donors may lead to a higher magnitude increase of organ supply.
Interestingly, none of the above studies revealed any neonates 
who were declared brain dead. It is possible that brain death is 
rare in neonates because of the effects of open fontanels and 
unfused skull sutures on decreasing the likelihood of herniation 
and progression to brain death. However, this peculiarity could be 
self-fulfilling because the relative rarity of brain death in neonates 
may have caused a lack of awareness of the condition, leading 
to less brain death evaluations. It is also possible that because 
neonatal practitioners generally do not treat organ transplant 
recipients, they may have misconceptions about organ donation, 
lack of familiarity with DCDD and DBD processes, and inexperi-
ence in counseling families of potential donors (39).
Medical teams should refer imminent deaths to local OPOs 
in a timely manner. The US Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services mandates timely referrals for organ donation for hospi-
tals participating in the programs. There is no explicit definition 
of a “timely referral,” but in older children it generally means 
a planned or imminent death, or a neurologic injury with a 
GCS score of 5 or less. Clinical triggers or scoring systems for 
neonates have not been established, which presents an additional 
challenge (39).
Neonates with birth defects likely to be lethal immediately 
after birth represent another potential group of organ donors. 
Anencephaly is a severe neural tube defect in which the cerebral 
hemispheres including the neocortex, part of the meninges, skull, 
and scalp are missing. Infants born with this condition are blind, 
deaf, unconscious, and unable to perceive pain. Since there may 
be some degree of brainstem function including breathing and 
brainstem reflexes, it is possible for infants to live a few hours 
or even a few days, at which point death usually occurs. The 
incidence of anencephaly in the United States is approximately 
1/5000 live births, which translates to approximately 700 infants 
born alive per year (41). Since the diagnosis is often known 
prior to birth, and death is certain, it is a condition that may 
be amenable to recovery of organs that can be perfectly viable. 
However, since viable organs would only originate from anence-
phalic infants born alive, similar concerns regarding the Dead 
Donor Rule and the declaration of death as in DCDD have been 
brought up. In the late 1980s, several ethically oriented publica-
tions pointed toward the inaccuracy in determining death in 
anencephalics. One argument was a potential slippery slope 
(42, 43). If it is justified to “use” them for their organs, people 
with other conditions with a poor neurologic prognosis but who 
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are not brain dead could be similarly be “used.” At the time, 
other proponents of anencephalics as organ donors pointed to 
the marginal value of their life as humans, as never possessing 
even rudimentary ability to think, process sensory input, or feel 
pain (44, 45). In 2005, the Canadian Pediatric Society published 
a position paper recommending against organ donation from 
anencephalic neonates due to the difficulty in establishing brain 
death in this condition (46). The statement also cites the risks of 
the “slippery slope” in using organs from other brain-damaged 
living people, risk of losing public trust in transplantation 
programs, and risk of losing public respect for value of human 
life. Since then, there have been relatively fewer reports in the 
literature regarding anencephalic organ donation. However, as 
neonatal organ donation is becoming recognized as a potential 
bridge to the gap between supply and demand for transplantable 
organs, it could become more relevant. Wijetunga et al. reported 
the organ recovery of an anencephalic infant in 2015 (47). This 
case involved a twin gestation, and the condition of the affected 
fetus was known prenatally. The parents were counseled prior to 
the baby’s birth and agreed to organ donation. The kidneys were 
accepted for potential transplant and the organ recovery team 
was mobilized when the mother was in labor. The baby was born 
alive, and had circulatory arrest and organ recovery 1 h, 35 min 
after delivery. The ethical considerations in this case, including 
declaration of death and potential conflict of interest, are similar 
to that in DCDD because the procedure of organ recovery was 
in fact DCDD. It was not clear in this case whether the parents 
initiated the discussion of organ donation prenatally, or if it 
was the primary medical team or OPO. Regarding DCDD, any 
discussion of organ donation occurring before death can present 
a conflict of interest between the medical community and the 
potential donor. Neurologic prognosis for a living patient could 
be affected by a potential gain to the medical community or 
transplant recipients. Even if that is not the case, families could 
perceive it, which could lead to mistrust. However, this issue is 
less relevant in anencephalic organ donation compared to other 
disease states because the prognosis and the complete lack of 
meaningful neurologic function are more certain. This case 
establishes the procedural and ethical feasibility of organ recov-
ery from anencephalic neonates, which can be accomplished 
as long as uniform criteria for death are observed and ethical 
considerations are acknowledged.
CONCLUSiON
The overarching goal for neonatal and pediatric organ donation 
and transplantation is to maximize benefits to the donors and 
the recipients without causing harm or violating autonomy. The 
medical community can approach this goal by providing families 
of dying children the opportunity to donate without an actual 
or perceived conflict of interest between potential donors and 
recipients. One can minimize harm to the donor with applica-
tion of firm criteria for neurologic or circulatory criteria prior to 
organ recovery. Systems are in place to ensure timely referrals of 
potential donors, to empower trained individuals of OPOs to dis-
cuss organ donation with families, and to appropriately allocate 
organs based on donor-specific and recipient-specific factors.
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